by
Max Siollun
In the weeks leading up to January 15th
Nzeogwu carried out reconnaissance on the official Lodge of the
Northern Region Premier: the Sardauna of Sokoto Ahmadu Bello. Nzeogwu
often took his men on a night-time “training exercise” known as
“Exercise Damisa.” The men were unaware that the military exercise they
were participating in was actually a practice run for a military coup
to overthrow the Government. The commander of the 2nd
Brigade in Kaduna Brigadier Ademulegun became aware of and was irritated
by the night-time training (when he became aware that soldiers had been
going near the Premier’s Lodge). He reprimanded Nzeogwu in a telephone
call and warned him to keep his military exercises a safe distance away
from the Premier’s Lodge. Although Ademulegun complained about the
commotion, he took no further action as he was unaware of the exercise’s
real purpose. Ademulegun was a polished soldier that had been Maj-Gen
Ironsi’s rival for the job of GOC. His control over his troops was such
that very few soldiers from his Brigade participated in the coup. Thus
Nzeogwu had to conscript young soldiers from the Nigerian Military
Training College to carry out the coup in Kaduna.
In
the early hours of January15 1966, Nzeogwu decided to turn “Exercise
Damisa” into a full-blown military coup. Nzeogwu led a group of
soldiers into a bush adjacent to the Premier’s Lodge. Once there
Nzeogwu informed the men of their real mission: they were to attack the
Premier’s Lodge. Nzeogwu and his men blew open the gates to the
Sardauna’s lodge and Nzeogwu personally conducted a search of the
residence – hunting for Bello. After losing his temper at his initial
failure to locate him, Nzeogwu found Bello hiding with his wives. Bello
was shot by Nzeogwu. Bello’s faithful bodyguard who came to defend him
with a bow and arrows was also shot, as well as one of his wives who
tried to shield him with her body. Nzeogwu was fiercely committed to
the coup and was the only one of the coupists able to execute his
mission. His personal assertion that “it is impossible to vote out a
Nigerian minister” showed his own conviction in his actions.
BRIGADIER ADEMULEGUN
Nzeogwu’s
co-conspirator in Kaduna, Major Tim Onwuategwu, personally led a
detachment of soldier to Brigadier Ademulegun’s house. Onwuategwu made
his way up to the Brigadier’s bedroom where he was laying beside his
wife. Upon seeing Onwuategwu enter the room, Ademulegun shouted at him
“Timothy, what the devil do you think you are doing?” (see Gbulie: “Nigeria’s Five Majors”).
Onwuategwu told Ademulegun that he was “under arrest.” According to
the Majors’ version of events, Ademulegun reached for a drawer beside
his bed, and as he did so, Onwuategwu shot him dead in his bed, along
with Ademulegun’s wife who was lying beside him.
COLONEL SHODEINDE
The
head of the NMTC Colonel Ralph Shodeinde was also killed. The manner of
his death is unclear. His wife (who was present when he was killed)
testified that he was shot by several soldiers including Majors Nzeogwu
and Onwuategwu. Other accounts claim that a grenade was tossed at him.
It is not clear whether Nzeogwu could possibly have been involved in
Shodeinde’s death since presumably he was pre-occupied at the time with
killing Ahmadu Bello. Most accounts place responsibly for Shodeinde’s
murder with Onwuategwu. The Majors’ bloodlust in some cases and failure
to kill others is puzzling. The same Major Onwuategwu who shot his
commanding officers and their wives arrested, but did not harm the
Governor of the Northern Region: Sir Kashim Ibrahim. When released,
Ibrahim vouched that he had been treated with utmost respect by the men
who abducted him. The Majors clearly had their “favourites” when it
came to sparing or ending lives.
HASSAN KATSINA
The commander of the 2nd
Recce squadron in Kaduna was not harmed during the coup. Shortly
before the coup, Katsina bumped into Nzeogwu. Nzeogwu exchanged
pleasantries with Katsina and inquired about Katsina’s children and
family. Some have speculated that the conversation between the two men
may have saved Katsina’s life as Nzeogwu’s familiarity with Katsina’s
personal life may have led to him to exclude Katsina from his
calculations out of empathy. Whether that is true or not, when the two
men first met again shortly after the coup, Nzeogwu directly asked
Katsina: “Are you with us or against us?” Seeing that Nzeogwu was
holding a gun, Katsina wisely replied, “You know I am with you.”
Nzeogwu used the strategy more than once in the days following the coup
as a means of testing the loyalty of other officers.
LAGOS
The
Lagos branch of the coup was led by Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna. As well
as being a degree holder before his military career, Ifeajuna had been
an international athlete who held the commonwealth high-jumping record.
The key officers assisting Ifeajuna in Lagos were Majors Wale
Ademoyega, Don Okafor, Chris Anuforo, and Humphrey Chukwuka.
At around 2 am, Ifeajuna and some lieutenants left the 2nd
Brigade HQ and made their way to Prime Minister Abubakar Tafewa
Balewa’s residence. They overpowered (but did not kill) the police
officers standing guard there, and Ifeajuna kicked down the door of the
Prime Minister’s bedroom before leading him out at gunpoint. It appears
that while the arrest of the Prime Minister was part of the plot, his murder
may not have been, and Ifeajuna and some of his co-conspirators may
have exceeded their orders in killing him. In the aftermath of the
coup, Nzeogwu rattled off a list of names that were on the Majors' hit
list. He mentioned the usual unsurprising suspects such as Bello,
Azikiwe, and Akintola. Balewa’s name was conspicuously absent. Balewa
was not killed until it was clear that the coup was doomed to fail.
Balewa asked for, and was given time to say his prayers before he was
shot by Major Ifeajuna. It was clear that not all arrested persons were
to be killed. Some politicians (such as Sir Kashim Ibrahim and Dr.
Michael Okpara) were arrested but released unharmed.
Many
of the army’s senior officers were attending a party in honour of the
Lagos-based first Brigade’s commander, Brigadier Maimalari. Some of the
officers attending that party (including Maimalari himself) were to
meet the grim reaper less than 24 hours after that party. Ifeajuna’s
murder of his commanding officer Maimalari was probably the single
greatest act of treachery on the night of the coup. In the absence of
the vibrant and instant news media of today, an information chasm
existed as the Government (for fear of increasing tension in the
country) made little or no comment about the events of January. Thus
rumours and conspiracy theories about victims’ whereabouts and
miraculous manner of death/survival thrived. A riot almost broke out
when an attempt was made to replace Brigadier Maimalari's commanding
officer nameplate at the 2nd Brigade Headquarters in Lagos.
Maimalari
was widely regarded as an excellent soldier that was headed for the
top. His toughness was such that many northern NCOs refused to accept
his death and instead believed that Maimalari had made a miraculous
escape from the January Majors and was still alive. This had a tiny
semblance of truth: Maimalari managed to escape from the first attempt
to arrest him by Major Don Okafor by jumping over a wall behind his
house but, as he was escaping on foot, he came across the car of his
Brigade Major: Emmanuel Ifeajuna. Maimalari recognised Ifeajuna (who was
Maimalari’s Brigade Major), and did not realise that Ifeajuna was part
of the coup plot. Erroneously believing that Ifeajuna could be trusted,
Maimalari waved down the car, and was promptly shot dead by Ifeajuna.
Maimalari's murder was a great loss to the northern soldiers who
respected him and to Nigeria as a whole. So famed was Maimalari’s
toughness that the northern soldiers who murdered Maj-Gen Ironsi and
Lt-Col Fajuyi six months later in a revenge coup actually “interrogated”
the two men and demanded that they disclose the whereabouts of
Brigadier Maimalari (whom they believed was still alive).
The commanding officer of the Ibadan based 4th
battalion, Lt-Col Abogo Largema, was a guest at the Ikoyi hotel on the
night of the coup. Ifeajuna arrived at the hotel and forced the desk
clerk at gunpoint, to inform Largema that he had a “phone call.” When
Largema emerged from his room to take the bogus “phone call" call, Major
Ifeajuna and a subaltern emerged from their hiding place in the
corridor and shot Largema dead.
Other
officers who were considered as pro-Government or who could prevent the
coup were also killed. The army’s GOC Major-General Ironsi was tipped
off about the coup by a telephone call from the Army’s Adjutant-General,
Lt-Col James Pam. Shortly after ending the telephone call with Ironsi,
Pam was abducted from his house and shot dead by Major Chris Anuforo.
Pam was the son of the chief of Jos and was widely liked within the
army, and regarded as a very capable officer. He was also a father of
six. The Majors' decision to kill him mortified his colleagues. Anuforo
was most hasty in the use of his firearm on the night of January 15.
He personally shot dead Lt-Cols Pam and Unegbe, Colonel Kur Mohammed,
and the Finance Minister Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. Okotie-Eboh was
widely disliked during the first republic for his corruption, and the
former British colonial officer Sir James Robertson once referred to him
as “a cheerful rogue” and “a byword for making money on the side.”
Okotie-Eboh’s arrest was particularly aggressive and eyewitnesses say
that the soldiers who arrested him tossed him into their army Land Rover
“like a sack.” He was shot dead by Major Anuforo despite pleading for
his life. Balewa, Kur Mohammed and Okotie-Eboh were initially
kidnapped, but killed later when it became clear that the coup was not
going to succeed.
IBADAN
The
coup caught many of the army’s high command by surprise as many of them
were away from their posts. Lt-Col Francis Fajuyi was on leave, and
command of the Lagos battalion was in the process of being transferred
from Lt-Col Hilary Njoku to Lt-Col Gowon, who was returning from a
course overseas. In Ibadan, the Premier of the western region Chief
Samuel Akintola had been forewarned that soldiers were coming to get
him. Akintola had heard rumours of a coup and had travelled to Kaduna to
warn the Premier of the northern region Ahmadu Bello. Frustrated that
his warnings failed to elicit the required degree of urgency from Bello,
Akintola returned to Ibadan and armed himself with a rifle. His deputy
Chief Fani-Kayode was first arrested by the coupists. After this
arrest, Kayode’s wife informed Akintola of what had happened. Shortly
afterward, a detachment of soldiers led by Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi
arrived at Akintola’s residence. Upon sighting the soldiers, Akintola
opened fire – lightly wounding a few of them including Capt Nwobosi.
After bravely fighting for his life and engaging the soldiers in a
gunfight, Akintola was shot dead by Nwobosi and his men.
THE ROLE OF NORTHERN SOLDIERS
Not
many realize that several officers of northern origin took part in
Nigeria’s first military coup. The “Igbo coup” tag attached to the
Majors’ assault ignores the fact that scores of northern officers took
part in the Lagos operations, and even assisted Nzeogwu when he stormed
the residence of the Northern Region’s premier: Ahmadu Bello. Nzeogwu
later described the detachment of troops accompanying him to Bello’s
house as “a truly Nigerian gathering” (New Nigerian – 18th January 1966). Nzeogwu pointed out that the northern soldiers accompanying him “had
the chance to drop out. More than that, they had bullets. They had
been issued with bullets but I was unarmed. If they disagreed they
could have shot me….most of the Other Ranks were Northerners but they
followed.” Among the prominent northern soldiers that helped
Nzeogwu to overthrow the Northern Region’s government was John Atom
Kpera. Kpera later became the military governor of Benue State. Many
of the soldiers that accompanied Major Ifeajuna when he abducted the
Prime Minister: Tafewa Balewa, were also northerners.
THE ONLY IGBO TO DIE
Many claim that the January 15th
1966 coup was a gigantic Igbo plot to transfer control of the Federal
Government from northerners to the Igbo. However, one stumbling block
in this argument was that the Majors killed an Igbo officer during the
coup. The proponents of the “Igbo coup” argument have tried to
rationalize the murder of Lt-Col Arthur Unegbe by arguing that he was
not initially a target of the Majors, but was only killed because he
refused to surrender the keys of the armoury. This argument displays an
ignorance of military postings and procedure. At the time of the
January coup, Unegbe was the Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army
at Army Headquarters in Lagos. Not being in command of a combat unit,
he had no access to any armoury keys. As soldiers, the Majors would
have known this. Also, the fact that Unegbe was SHOT proves that the
Majors were already armed when they got to him. Why kill him to get
access to weapons they already had? Additionally, the mutineers in
other units outside Lagos managed to get their hands on weapons without
resorting to killing the respective Quartermasters of their various
units. What is more probable is that Unegbe was killed because he was
known to be close to Brigadier Maimalari. Thus the Majors probably
figured that Unegbe had to be silenced in order to prevent him from
raising the alarm.
IRONSI
The
Majors’ failure to arrest or kill the General Officer Commanding (GOC)
the Nigerian Army, Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, has led some to
believe that he was part of, or was at the very least tipped off about,
the coup plot. Ironsi and other senior officers had in the weeks
leading up to the coup become concerned by the possibility of a junior
officers’ coup. These concerns were passed on to the Prime Minister who
either did not take them seriously, or chose not to act in response.
Depending
on whose story one believes, Ironsi was either (i) in on the plot and
an ally of the Majors (ii) was on the Majors hit list but managed to
escape due to being tipped off by Igbo participants within the coup
circle. The truth may lie within Nzeogwu’s famous “Africa and the
World” interview with Dennis Ejindu. Nzeogwu’s comments in that
interview are instructive. Nzeogwu said of the coup plot: "We got some
but not all. GENERAL IRONSI WAS TO HAVE BEEN SHOT. But we were not
ruthless enough. As a result he and the other compromisers were able to
supplant us" (Daily Telegraph, 22nd January 1966). If Ironsi was part of the coup plot, why would the Majors plan to kill him?
Ironsi’s
survival in January owed more to good fortune than to him being privy
to the coup plot (as well as the Majors tactical mistake in arresting or
killing other senior officers before they got hold of Ironsi). As the
GOC, he was tipped off that in the early stages of the coup, and was
informed something that unusual was occurring via a telephone call from
Lt-Col James Pam.
The
commotion caused by the murders of other officers alerted Ironsi to the
coup and he was able to rally troops who helped him to put down the
Majors’ coup. On his way to commence moves to crush the coup, Ironsi
actually came across some junior officers that were involved in the
coup. It is possible that some of these young officers lost their nerve
when confronted by the intimidating presence of their GOC. When he
encountered a checkpoint manned by some of the mutineers, Ironsi simply
stepped out of his vehicle, and roared “get out of my way!” (an order
which was promptly obeyed) before continuing his journey. After the
coup was suppressed, Ironsi met with the surviving members of the
federal cabinet. Even northern ministers present at that meeting
conceded that Ironsi was genuinely upset by, and wept about the death of
his military colleagues.
THE AFTERMATH
Maj-Gen
Ironsi rallied the bulk of the army and managed to put down the coup.
The coup leaders (except Ifeajuna who fled to Ghana) were placed under
arrest. Major Nzeogwu handed over control of the northern region to
Ironsi’s appointed designee, Major Hassan Katsina, and was escorted by
Lt-Col Conrad Nwawo (an officer whom Nzeogwu trusted) to Lagos where he
surrendered to Maj-Gen Ironsi. The surviving members of the Federal
cabinet handed over the reigns of Govt to Ironsi who suspended several
parts of the constitution (mostly those parts dealing with party
politics), banned all political parties and formed a new military
government with a Supreme Military Council consisting of the following:
NAME
|
POSITION
|
Maj-Gen Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi
|
Supreme Commander, Nigerian Armed Forces and Head of State
|
Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe
|
Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defence Forces
|
Commodore Joseph Wey
|
Commanding Officer - Nigerian Navy
|
Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon
|
Chief of Staff, Army
|
Lt-Colonel George Kurubo
|
Commanding Officer - Nigerian Air Force
|
Lt-Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu
|
Military Governor, Eastern Region
|
Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina
|
Military Governor, Northern Region
|
Lt-Colonel David Ejoor
|
Military Governor, Mid-West Region
|
Lt-Colonel Francis Fajuyi
|
Military Governor, Western Region
|
After
the January 1966 coup, a succession of military Governments led Nigeria
for thirteen years until a military regime headed by General Olusegun
Obasanjo (the current democratic president) restored the country to
civilian democratic rule in 1979. The army returned to power again in
1984 and did not leave until 1999. The Majors’ coup proved to be the
catalyst for several military regimes – each one progressively more
authoritarian than the one that preceded it. Most of the January Majors
are not alive today to tell their stories. Of the conspirators Major
Ademoyega and Captain Gbulie have written books on the coup. The
following table shows the fate of the key participants.
THE CONSPIRATORS
NAME
|
POSITION BEFORE THE COUP
|
FATE
|
Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna
|
Brigade Major: 1st Brigade - Lagos
|
Executed during the Nigerian civil war after planning a rebellion against Lt-Col Ojukwu.
|
Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu
|
Chief Instructor, Nigerian Military Training College: Kaduna
|
Killed in the early days of the Nigerian civil war while fighting for Biafra.
|
Major Tim Onwuategwu
|
Instructor, Nigerian Military Training College: Kaduna
|
Killed in the days following the Nigerian civil war.
|
Major Don Okafor
|
CO – Federal Guard
|
Abducted
from Abeokuta prison (where he was detained for his part in the coup)
by northern soldiers in July 1966, and killed (several accounts say he
was buried alive).
|
Major Chris Anuforo
|
Reconnaissance Squadron
|
Abducted
from Benin prison (where he was detained for his part in the coup) by
northern soldiers in August 1966, tortured and killed.
|
Major Humphrey Chukwuka
|
Infantry
|
Unknown.
|
Major Adewale Ademoyega
|
Infantry
|
Alive
|
Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi
|
Artillery
|
Alive
|
Captain Ben Gbulie
|
Army engineers
|
Alive
|
Captain Oji
|
Infantry
|
Killed in February 1968 during the Nigerian civil war.
|
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